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Abstract 
Since the 1970s, the process of decentralization has spread throughout the world, 
and today more than 95% of democratic countries are decentralized. 
Decentralization should lead to a well-organized and more efficient local 
government. Nevertheless, the empirical results are rather vague. The motivation 
for this paper is to examine the impact of political and fiscal decentralization on 
the quality of government in seventeen countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
for the period 1998 - 2012. The main objective of the paper is to explore whether 
fiscal decentralization positively influences the quality of government and 
whether political decentralization reduces its positive influence. An additional 
contribution of the paper comes from the introduction of a decentralization 
                                                          
1 This paper has emerged from master thesis of Maja Herman, under the mentorship of Josip Viskovic, PhD. 
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interaction variable. Our results have shown that fiscal decentralization has a 
positive impact on governance, while political decentralization was found to be 
statistically insignificant. Our results also showed that richer countries have 
higher government quality, that government size increases the level of corruption 
and decreases government quality, and that in more democratic countries 
politicians behave more responsibly and accountably, which decreases the level 
of corruption and increases government quality. We conclude that political 
decentralization cancels out the positive effects of fiscal decentralization on the 
quality of government, which can be explained by less developed institutions at 
the local level in Central and Eastern European countries. 
Keywords: fiscal decentralization, political decentralization, government 
quality, CEE countries 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Decentralization refers to the transfer of authority and responsibilities 
for the delivery of public services from the central to the local level. Indeed, 
lower levels of government play an increasingly important role in the 
development of the country (Krtalic and Gasparini, 2007). Decentralization can 
also be defined as a tool to achieve greater efficiency and competitiveness at both 
regional and national levels. According to Schneider (2003), devolution of 
powers and resources to lower levels of government increases economic 
efficiency. In relation, the process of decentralization has covered more than 95% 
of democratic countries since the 1970s (Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). 
Decentralization includes fiscal, administrative and political dimensions 
(Schneider, 2003). Fiscal decentralization refers to the degree of fiscal cession to 
non-central government entities, that is, it defines the ability of local governments 
to have local revenues and income transferred from the central government with 
some discretionary spending. Administrative decentralization refers to the degree 
of autonomy that decentralized units of government have relative to central 
control, i.e., it involves the redistribution of responsibility, authority, and sources 
of funding across different levels of government. Political decentralization refers 
to the degree of governance carried out by decentralized government units, i.e. it 
denotes the power that citizens and elected representatives have in the decision-
making process (Schneider, 2003; Krtalic and Gasparini, 2007). Nevertheless, 
views on the impact of fiscal and political decentralization on the quality of 
government are unclear and there are arguments both for and against 
decentralization. 
CEE countries had various institutional characteristics before the 1990s - 
planned economy, low operational efficiency, high level of corruption, low level 
of democracy and protection of human rights. Therefore, fundamental reforms of 
political and economic institutions were necessary, i.e. transition from socialism 
to democracy and market economy. This included the transition of the economy 
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from a centrally controlled economy with state-owned enterprises to a market 
economy based on private enterprises and private ownership. In addition, the 
transition also included political changes including political freedom. These countries 
were in a situation of adjustment and balance between the high role of government 
and the efficient transition to a market economy. This meant stabilizing the economy, 
liberalizing the conditions for doing business, privatizing enterprises, and changing 
the institutional environment. Since effective government institutions are important 
for economic growth and development, institutional transition was also necessary: 
Entrepreneurship development, protection of property rights, effectiveness of market 
mechanisms, etc. However, many of them failed to do so. Indeed, Szarzec et al. 
(2014) point out that a common problem of all transition countries is the low quality 
of regulation, the almost non-existent rule of law and the lack of control over 
corruption. These low scores could be the legacy of the former socialist system, but 
also show the ineffectiveness or unwillingness of decision makers to adopt and 
execute the right laws. Finally, Szarzec et al (2014), comparing transition countries, 
concluded that those countries where effective state institutions have not been 
developed tend to experience social destabilization and subsequently slow economic 
growth. This implies the need for further research on the determinants of good 
governance as a prerequisite for economic growth. With regard to decentralization in 
these countries, Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer (2009) describe it as only partially 
successful due to macroeconomic instability, poor quality of institutions, and an 
incomplete and insufficiently transparent process of decentralization considering the 
asymmetry between responsibilities and resources.  
Recently, however, there has been a growing number of research papers 
examining fiscal and political decentralization and the quality of government. 
Most studies have focused on fiscal decentralization and the results show that it 
improves quality. Regarding the relationship between political decentralization 
and government quality, there is a lack of empirical work and the results of a few 
are not unanimous. Moreover, these two aspects of decentralization are 
interrelated. Indeed, political decentralization must be followed by fiscal 
decentralization, i.e. local government funding should be on a sound fiscal 
footing and consistent with local government functions. Therefore, it is also 
important to examine the joint effect of these two aspects of decentralization on 
the quality of government. Moreover, transition countries have been neglected in 
empirical research, and this paper fills this gap, so the contribution of this paper 
lies in the scarcity of research regarding the above relationship, which has not 
been explored enough empirically. 
After the introduction section where the aim and problem of the research 
were introduced, the paper includes a literature review section where the 
relationship between decentralization and quality of government is examined and 
presented. The third section explains the research methodology while the main 
empirical findings are presented in section four. The final section is the 
conclusion, which summarizes the relevant findings with accompanying 
recommendations. 
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the post Bretton Wood Conference period of 1994, it was felt that the 
plans and programs of the central government were the most important thing for 
the development of a country. However, this approach did not prove to be correct 
because, in addition to the lack of sustainable economic growth in many 
developing countries, reduced public freedom, increasing corruption and low 
level of quality of public services and increase in poverty denoted the period of 
strong expansion of central government (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). Therefore, in 
the last two decades, many international organizations and the governments of 
many countries have advocated a greater role for lower levels of government in 
achieving development goals. It has been believed that by devolving greater 
powers and responsibilities to local authorities, these goals can be achieved, 
devolving greater powers to lower levels of government will lead to public 
policies that are closer to the people, more efficient allocation of resources, and 
ultimately greater economic growth (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). However, to 
achieve these goals, local governments must also be well organized, which means 
that political decentralization must be followed by appropriate fiscal 
decentralization. 
Korotun et al. (2020) assessed the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
GDP per capita growth for 13 countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
authors found that revenue decentralization and tax autonomy had a negative 
impact on economic growth. But expenditure decentralization was associated 
with a positive GDP growth rate. Moreover, structural transformations radically 
reduced the size of the public sector in Central and Eastern Europe, which had a 
positive impact on the economy. The main components of local budget tax 
revenues are income tax and property tax.  
Stojčić and Šuman Tolić (2019) examined the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth, taking into account the multidimensional 
nature of the transmission channels between the two. The analysis is applied to 
the dataset of 24 Western and Central and Eastern Europe countries covering the 
years 2005 - 2012. Their results support both direct and indirect effects of 
decentralization on economic growth. The results are particularly interesting with 
respect to vertical fiscal imbalances and the size of the government sector. The 
former suggests that countries where local governments rely more on their own 
revenues rather than transfers from the central level are more prosperous. The 
latter result contradicts the Leviathan hypothesis and suggests that increasing the 
size of the government sector promotes economic growth.  
Jurlina Alibegović et al. (2018) in their study examined the extent to 
which Croatian large cities control their tax revenues and specify the ability of 
these authorities to introduce taxes and generate revenues independently. The 
results of their analysis show that cities do not sufficiently use the available fiscal 
instruments to plan and realize budget revenues. Bajo and Bronić (2004) have 
also shown that the so-called fiscal equalization system in Croatia, which is based 
EKON. MISAO I PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXX. (2021.) BR. 1. (285 - 302)                                  J. Visković et al: IMPACT OF POLITICAL... 
289 
on revenue sharing between the state and local units and grants from the central 
government to local units, is not effective. The problem is that the mechanism of 
fiscal equalization is not based on a good assessment of fiscal inequalities and on 
the established fiscal position of local units, which would take into account 
reliable calculations of fiscal capacities. The poorly regulated mechanism of 
inter-budgetary transfers, especially the lack of criteria for the transfer of grants, 
has slowed down the implementation of fiscal decentralization, and the use of 
funds received through decentralization is inefficient. The reasons for this 
situation should be sought at the level of central government, but also at the level 
of local units. 
However, there can also be negative effects of decentralization. 
Decentralization can lead to coordination problems that may ultimately delay or 
prevent reforms (the problem of vetoing the adoption of measures). A "race to the 
bottom" can also be observed, leading to lower local tax rates and local revenues 
that may not be necessary to finance public goods. As a result, the quality of 
government deteriorates (Dreher, 2006), suggesting that the benefits of 
decentralization may have been overestimated. Given the arguments for and 
against decentralization, it is necessary to look at the empirical results to 
understand the relationship between fiscal and political decentralization and 
government quality, but first general features about decentralization in central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries are given. 
 
2.1.  Fiscal decentralization and government quality 
Bird and Wallich (1993) define fiscal decentralization as part of a 
package of reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of the public sector, 
increasing competition among subnational governments in the provision of public 
services and goods, and promoting economic growth. Fiscal decentralization, 
according to Thiessen (2003), means giving government bodies below the central 
level the power to collect tax revenues and make independent decisions on 
expenditures. 
Studies on fiscal decentralization have mostly examined its impact on 
regional inequalities or economic growth, while the relationship with quality of 
government is usually analysed through the level of corruption and other aspects 
of quality of government are neglected. Nevertheless, a positive relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and government quality has been confirmed. 
Huther and Shah (1998) examined the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and government quality using OLS regression for 80 countries at 
different stages of economic development. The work also aimed to fill the gap in 
measuring governance quality by constructing an index. The research results 
show that fiscal decentralization improves governance quality as measured by 
governance index. The research findings are consistent with the theoretical 
literature on fiscal federalism, which considers an increase in public sector 
responsibility. However, this study is biased due to omitted variables. Namely, 
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data on subnational expenditures were only available for forty of the eighty 
countries in the sample, and data on the governance quality index did not cover 
all countries, and missing data were filled in with estimates. 
De Mello and Barenstein (2001) conducted their analysis in 78 
developed and developing countries for the period 1980 - 1998. Their results 
showed that fiscal decentralization is related to various indicators of governance. 
They controlled for the influence of GDP per capita and population size and 
proved that decentralization of expenditure functions to the subnational level can 
improve governance. Moreover, their results showed that the source of 
subnational expenditure matters, i.e. the higher the proportion of grants and 
transfers and non-tax revenues, the stronger the relationship between 
decentralization and governance. They also showed that where subnational 
governments are large, further decentralization of the tax base can lead to 
allocative inefficiency and poor governance. 
Dreher's (2006) results, based on cross-sectional data for a maximum of 
129 countries and panel analyses for 70 countries from 1984 to 2001, have shown 
that decentralization improves governance to some extent. The results apply 
mainly to low-income countries, but to some extent also to high-income 
countries. However, while on the one hand decentralization improves governance, 
on the other hand it prevents reforms under certain conditions and consequently 
deteriorates governance and institutional quality. Moreover, the authors 
concluded that the number of subnational levels of government has a negative 
impact on governance. Finally, revenue decentralization reduces the cost of 
setting up businesses and has a positive impact on compliance with the rule of 
law, but these effects are diminished as countries become wealthier. The author 
controlled for GDP per capita, country population, and civil liberties. 
In line with previous research are the findings of Kyriacou and Roca-
Sagales (2009). They also show the positive relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and the quality of government. The study covered 29 countries 
between 1984 and 1997. The indicator of government quality used in this paper 
represents an average of three dimensions: Corruption, Rule of Law, and 
Bureaucratic Quality, taken from the ICRG database. 
Kyriacou and Roca-Sagales (2011) conducted another empirical study. 
They applied a cross-sectional analysis with 101 countries and an unbalanced 
panel data analysis with 58 countries in the sample for the period from 1998 to 
2006. Compared to the previous study, an additional dimension was added to the 
indicator of government quality, namely government effectiveness. Data were 
taken from the World Bank's Worldwide Government Indicators database (WGI), 
while data on fiscal decentralization were taken from the IMF's Government 
Finance Statistics database (GFS). The results are consistent with most of the 
empirical literature and show that fiscal decentralization improves governance. 
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2.2.  Political decentralization and government quality 
While most theoretical and empirical research confirms that fiscal 
decentralisation improves the quality of government, the results on the effects of 
political decentralisation are ambiguous. For example, on the one hand, political 
decentralisation may improve the quality of government because subnational 
governments are better informed and voters are able to punish local politicians for 
unacceptable behaviour at the next election. On the other hand, political 
decentralisation may also reduce quality because it is difficult for citizens to 
assess responsibility for activities among multiple levels of government 
(Kyriacou and Roca-Sagales, 2011) and, in addition, corruption may be more 
likely in local communities because of the familiarity and closer relationships 
between interest groups and those in power. There is also a problem in measuring 
political decentralisation as many different indicators are used, making it difficult 
to compare results. 
Fisman and Gatti (2002) introduced federalism as a variable when 
examining the relationship between political decentralisation and corruption. 
Federalism was a dummy variable indicating the presence of a federal structure in 
a country. The authors concluded that there was no statistically significant 
relationship between federalism and corruption. Similarly, Treisman et al. (2000) 
found no relationship between decentralisation of decision making and 
corruption, i.e. that federal states are more corrupt. Moreover, the authors found 
that parallel political and fiscal decentralisation has an impact on the quality of 
governance. 
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) examined the extent to which the 
effect of fiscal decentralisation on governance and economic growth depends on 
the characteristics of political institutions. They analysed data for 95 countries 
from 1975 to 2000. The results show that fiscal decentralisation combined with 
strong national parties significantly increases the quality of government, i.e., 
government efficiency, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and rule of law, 
and improves the provision of health and education services. They have also 
found evidence that subordination of local governments to higher-level 
governments in developed and developing countries increases the effect of 
decentralisation on growth and the provision of public goods, and in developing 
countries on the quality of government. The measure of fiscal decentralisation 
used was the share of subnational revenues and expenditures in total government 
expenditures and revenues from the IMF GFS. Measures of political 
decentralisation were taken from the DPI database. The World Bank indices and 
the corruption index from Transparency International were used as measures of 
government quality. 
Fan et al. (2009), in their cross-country dataset based on information 
from more than 480 sources and the results of a firm-level survey (interviewed 
business managers) conducted by the World Bank team in 80 countries in 1999 
and 2000 on specific firm experiences with bribery, concluded that neither 
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federalism, nor electoral decentralisation, nor decentralisation of decision making 
have a statistically significant impact on corruption. They also found that fiscal 
decentralisation lowers the level of corruption, while a greater number of levels 
of government increase it, due to the blurring of accountability. Finally, their 
findings pointed to the potential problem of uncoordinated rent-seeking that 
occurs when government structures become more complex. 
Kyriacou and Roca-Sagales (2009) included in their study the effect of 
the interaction between fiscal decentralisation and decentralisation in elections 
and decision making. They find that these types of political decentralisation 
reduce the positive effects of fiscal decentralisation on institutional quality in 
low- and middle-income countries, while the same forms of decentralisation 
increase the positive effects of fiscal decentralisation in rich countries. The 
authors concluded that this may be because political institutions at the subnational 
level in poorer countries are underdeveloped and unable to harness the positive 
effects of decentralisation through elections. Consequently, they have concluded 
that the marginal benefits of decentralisation in terms of quality of government 
diminish as GDP per capita increases. 
In their subsequent study, Kyriacou and Roca-Sagales (2011) confirmed 
that political decentralisation weakens the positive impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on government quality. They explained that this could be due to 
the fact that local officials tend to be captured by local interests, considering that 
they are endowed with fiscal revenues and are subject to elections. Therefore, a 
positive effect of fiscal decentralisation on the quality of government is achieved 
only if fiscal decentralisation is not accompanied by political decentralisation, 
which implies coordination problems or corrupt behaviour by local incumbents. 
 
3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The above research problem is investigated using multiple linear 
regression, with the sample covering the period from 1998 to 2012 due to data 
availability. Namely, the data for the variable autonomy, which denotes political 
decentralization, is only available up to 2012. The analysis includes 17 CEE 
countries: Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The research is conducted using the statistical 
program SPSS. 
The research follows the approach of Kyriacou and Roca-Sagales 
(2011). Therefore, fiscal decentralization is measured by the shares of tax and 
revenue decentralization and the data are obtained from the IMF database (2018). 
Although it could be criticized that these data do not reflect the 
multidimensionality of decentralization and do not provide information on the 
source of subnational revenues, they are the most commonly used measure of 
fiscal decentralization and are available for the countries in the sample. 
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Alternative data on fiscal decentralization, such as transfer dependence and 
vertical fiscal imbalances or allocation of expenditures by economic and 
functional classification, are not available for all countries in the sample. 
Political decentralization is measured in different ways depending on the 
study sample and period. In this study, it is considered as decision-making 
decentralization, and the dummy variable Autonomy from the World Bank 
Database of Political Institutions (2018) is used as its indicator. As explained 
earlier, data for this variable is only available up to 2012. 
There are many indicators that reflect the quality of government, and the most 
important ones are corruption control, rule of law, government effectiveness or 
protection of property rights (Charron et al, 2015). Therefore, these indicators are used 
as indicators of government quality and are available from the World Bank Governance 
Indicators (WBGI) prepared by Kaufman et al. (2006). These indicators combine the 
views of a wide range of stakeholders, i.e. citizens, businesses and expert surveys. The 
data are based on over 30 data sources obtained through surveys of representative 
individuals. The WBGI are considered the most accurate and reliable measures of 
government quality used in previous academic research. The indicator represents 
weighted averages of the underlying data. 
As in previous studies, appropriate control variables are included in the 
model. This is done to avoid the problem of bias due to omitted variables, which 
can significantly alter the research results. Based on the paper by Kyriacou and 
Roca-Sagales (2009 and 2011) and the paper by Triesman (2000), the model 
includes four control variables: GDP per capita (log value), trade openness, 
government size, and voice and accountability index. Kyriacou and Roca-Sagales 
(2009) believe that the influence of GDP per capita should be taken into account 
because richer countries have higher quality of government and higher quality 
promotes economic development, which is explained by the positive effect of 
income on education and literacy. Government size is expected to increase the 
level of corruption, but on the other hand, it could have a positive effect on the 
rule of law and the quality of regulation. The size of government is measured as 
the share of government in real GDP, and the data are from the Penn World 
Tables database (2018). Trade openness is also included in the model as 
suggested by Fisman and Gatti (2002). It is measured as exports and imports of 
goods and services as a share of GDP and small states are assumed to be more 
open to foreign trade and capital flows. In addition, smaller states should have 
more effective and honest governments as a larger proportion of the population 
needs to be involved in the established incumbent network, making it less 
attractive and cost effective (Triesman, 2000). Finally, the voice and 
accountability index is adopted from the WGI index group and used as an 
indicator of democracy. Namely, politicians in more democratic countries are 
expected to behave in a more responsible and accountable manner and reduce the 
level of corruption (Kyriacou and Roca-Sagales, 2009). Democracy is also 
associated with higher levels of decentralization. 
EKON. MISAO I PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXX. (2021.) BR. 1. (285 - 302)                                  J. Visković et al: IMPACT OF POLITICAL... 
294 
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the variables. As can be seen from 
Table 1, the number of observations for some variables is not 255, which means 
that the database is unbalanced. Regarding the key variables, we can observe that 
the maximum level of tax and revenue share is 47.6% (Belarus in 2003), the 
minimum is 0.013% (Estonia in 2007), while the average is 0.23%. Political 
decentralization is a dummy variable, so the maximum value is 1 and the 
minimum value is 0. The descriptive statistics are also given for the control 
variables and it can be found that the mean value of GDP per capita is 9355.73 
USD, trade openness is 101.83% of GDP, government size is 25% of GDP and 
voice and accountability is 0.32. 
Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 Mean Max Min N SD Median 
Fiscal decentralization 0,23 0,476 0,013 209 0,112 0,158 
Political decentralization 0,15 1 0 255 0,424 0 
GDP per capita 9355,73 25430,34 1413,89 255 5725,50 8918,49 
Openness 101,83 176,33 47,15 255 30,88 99,01 
Government size 25 43 7 240 4,9 24,95 
Voice and accountability 0,32 1,2 -1,77 223 0,8136 0,57 
Source: Authors calculation 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As noted earlier, multiple linear regression is used to examine the impact 
of fiscal and political decentralization on the quality of government. Formally, the 
model for the multiple linear regression is yi = β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + 
... βpxip + ei for i = 1,2, ... n, where i is country, Xit is the vector of control 
variables, and eit is the error term. 
Regarding the choice of method, which allows us to determine how the 
independent variables enter the analysis, we apply the ENTER method. This 
means that all variables are entered in a block in a single step i.e. simultaneously. 
The correlation between the variables was tested by Pearson correlation 
coefficient. The obtained correlation matrix is available on request. The 
significance of the regression model is tested by the F-test, testing the following 
hypotheses: 
H0: β0=β1=β2=….=βk=0 
H1: βj ≠0,      j=1,2,3,….k 
A null hypothesis is accepted if no coefficient of the independent 
variables specified in the model is statistically significant. If the test shows that at 
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least one of the above variables is statistically significant, the null hypothesis is 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis H1 is accepted. 
As it can be seen from Table 2, where the summed indicators are 
estimated for the whole model, the value of the coefficient of determination (R-
squared) is 0.968, which means that the regression model explains 96.8% of the 
variability of the response data around its mean, which means that the model fits 
the given data. Looking at the adjusted R-squared to show the goodness of fit of 
the regression model in terms of degrees of freedom, we can see that 96.5% of the 
variability of the response data is around its mean. 
Table 2 
Model summary 
Model R   R Square Adjusted     R Square 





Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 ,984 ,968 ,965 ,1403336 ,968 315,505 6 63 ,000 
Source: Authors calculation 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the analysis of variance. Table ANOVA 
shows whether our model is statistically significant. As we can see, the 
significance value is 0.000, which is less than 0.01, it can be confirmed that our 
model is statistically significant. 
Table 3 
Analysis of Variance - ANOVA table 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 37,280 6 6,213 315,505 ,000 
Residual 1,241 63 ,020   
Total 38,521 69    
Source: Authors calculation 
 
The final model that we estimate in this research has the following 
equation: GQi = β0 + β1FD + β2PD + β3GDPp/c + β4OP + β5GS + β6VA + ei, where 
i is country, GQ government quality, FD fiscal decentralization, PD political 
decentralization, GDPp/c gross domestic product per capita, OP trade openness, 
GS government size, VA voice and accountability and eit is the error term. 
Table 4 shows estimates of the multiple linear regression model. The 
table shows standardized coefficients β for each variable used in the model, as 
well as their significance and partial correlation coefficients. From the table, a 
positive and statistically significant (p = 0.002) effect of fiscal decentralization on 
the quality of government is evident. This result is consistent with previous 
empirical work and the theorem of "fiscal decentralization", i.e. local 
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governments are more able to meet local public needs of citizens than the central 
government. The parameter β1 has a value of 0.15, which means that the quality 
of government increases by 0.15 when the share of subnational revenue in total 
government revenue increases by one unit. 
Regarding political decentralization, the results indicate that although 
the β2 coefficient is negative (-0.033), which would mean that when political 
decentralization increases by one unit, the quality of government decreases by 
0.033, political decentralization proved not to be statistically significant (p = 
0.311), which is also consistent with some previous works that leave a vague 
relationship of the variables analysed, indicating the need to rethink the system of 
political decentralization in CEE countries, the need to better monitor local 
authorities. Indeed, if local politicians behave corruptly, it is questionable 










Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) -1,131 ,507  -2,229 ,029      
Fiscal 
decentralization ,011 ,003 ,150 3,227 ,002 -,617 ,377 ,073 ,236 4,245 
Political 
decentralization -,062 ,061 -,033 -1,021 ,311 ,301 -,128 -,023 ,504 1,982 
GDP per capita ,271 ,113 ,116 2,395 ,020 ,691 ,289 ,054 ,217 4,607 
Openness ,002 ,001 ,053 1,466 ,148 ,122 ,182 ,033 ,388 2,575 
Government 
size -1,578 ,716 -,076 -2,204 ,031 ,187 -,267 -,050 ,432 2,317 
Voice and 
accountability ,805 ,041 1,037 19,472 ,000 ,962 ,926 ,440 ,180 5,547 
Note: Dependent Variable: government quality 
Source: Authors calculation 
 
Regarding the control variables, the results imply the significance of the 
GDP per capita (p = 0.020), government size (p = 0.031) and voice and 
accountability (p = 0.000) variables, while the trade openness variable was found 
to be statistically insignificant (p = 0.148). The GDP per capita coefficient β3 was 
found to be statistically significant at a value of 0.116, implying that the quality 
of government increases by 0.116 units when GDP per capita increases by one 
unit. This is consistent with previous research, implying that richer countries have 
higher quality of government. In addition, government size has a statistically 
negative impact of -0.076 units on government quality, which confirms that 
government size increases the level of corruption, i.e. decreases government 
quality. Finally, government quality increases by 1.037 units when voice and 
accountability increase by one unit, confirming that politicians in more 
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democratic countries behave more responsibly and accountably, which reduces 
the level of corruption, i.e., increases government quality, which is consistent 
with previous research.  
Due to the fact that multiple independent variables are used in the 
multiple regression analysis, there might be a problem of multicollinearity that 
can negatively affect our regression results. To test for multicollinearity, we 
observe the value of VIF (Variance Inflation Factor), which estimates how much 
the variance of a regression coefficient is inflated due to multicollinearity in the 
model. Indeed, the more the VIF value increases the less reliable our regression 
results become. However, the coefficients for all variables except voice and 
accountability (5.547) are less than 5, which implies moderate correlation, but all 
coefficients are less than 10, which means there is no reason for concern, i.e., the 
multicollinearity problem does not exist in this case. 
Regarding the ambiguous results of the effect of decentralization, based 
on the previous research of Kyriacou and Roca-Sagales (2011), we further 
investigate the effect of the decentralization interaction variable on governance. 
Namely, we test whether political decentralization undermines the positive effects 
of fiscal decentralization, as demonstrated in previous research. Table 5 shows 
the results of the analysis of variance after introducing the interaction effect and it 
can be seen that the model is statistically significant at all significance levels. 
 
Table 5 
Analysis of Variance - ANOVA table – interaction effect of fiscal and political 
decentralization 
Model Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 37,280 5 7,456 384,497 ,000 
Residual 1,241 64 ,019   
Total 38,521 69    
Source: Authors calculation 
 
As can be seen from Table 6, the interaction variable is statistically 
significant at all significance levels (p = 0.001). Moreover, the standardized 
coefficient β1 is -0.147, which implies that a one-unit increase in the interaction 
variable between fiscal and political decentralization decreases the quality of 
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Table 6 





Coefficients t Sig. 
Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 




-,060 ,018 -,147 -3,407 ,001 ,667 -,392 -,076 ,269 3,711 
GDP per capita ,297 ,105 ,127 2,835 ,006 ,691 ,334 ,064 ,249 4,011 
Openness ,002 ,001 ,055 1,676 ,099 ,122 ,205 ,038 ,475 2,106 
Government size -1,512 ,707 -,073 -2,138 ,036 ,187 -,258 -,048 ,436 2,295 
Voice and 
accountability ,795 ,039 1,024 20,454 ,000 ,962 ,931 ,459 ,201 4,976 
Note: Dependent Variable: government quality 
Source: Authors calculation 
 
This result suggests that political decentralization attenuates the positive 
impact of fiscal decentralization on government quality which implies the need to 
review and improve the control over the use of local revenues by incumbent local 
authorities, i.e., it implies that local revenues are not allocated efficiently due to 
administrative reasons or corruptive behaviour. 
Finally, the inclusion of the interaction variable does not affect the 
significance of the other control variables, which means that GDP per capita and 
voice and accountability still have a significant positive impact on government 
quality, while government size affects it negatively. Regarding the problem of 
multicollinearity in our regression results, it can be observed that the VIF 
coefficients for all variables are less than 5, which means that there is no reason 
for concern about the reliability of our results. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Decentralization symbolizes a strengthening of the role of lower levels 
of government by providing them with more resources, greater autonomy, and the 
right to manage those resources. Over the years, decentralization has become an 
economic tool used to achieve various economic and political goals. 
Decentralization brings benefits to local citizens by increasing competition 
among lower levels of government and bringing government closer to citizens, 
resulting in higher levels of local democracy and political accountability. In some 
cases, however, decentralization can also be negative, as it creates coordination 
problems and consequently creates obstacles to the implementation of reforms. 
Moreover, competition may imply a "race to the bottom" that degrades the quality 
of government by driving down local tax rates. While richer countries increase 
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the efficiency of the public sector, the effects of decentralization in transition 
countries are vague and not clear enough. Therefore, this paper attempted to 
examine the extent to which decentralization really solves the problem of 
inefficient quality of government in transition countries. 
Therefore, the effects of fiscal and political decentralization on the 
quality of government in seventeen CEE countries from 1998 to 2012 were 
examined. The results have shown that fiscal decentralization positively affects 
the quality of government, which is consistent with most previous empirical work 
and literature confirming the "fiscal decentralization" theorem. The relationship 
between political decentralization and government quality was found to be 
statistically insignificant, implying the need to reconsider the system of political 
decentralization in CEE countries in the context of better monitoring of local 
politicians. Finally, we tested the interaction effect of both decentralizations and 
our results suggest that political decentralization undermines the positive effects 
of fiscal decentralization. It can be concluded that fiscal decentralization 
positively affects the quality of government only when it is not associated with 
political decentralization. The negative effects of political decentralization in 
these countries can be explained by less developed political institutions at the 
local levels, the lack of political responsibility and accountability in these 
countries. Incumbent in power behave corruptively because corruption is more 
likely in local communities due to familiarity and closer relationships between 
interest groups and incumbent in power. Finally, our results have also shown that richer 
countries have higher quality of government, that the size of government increases the 
level of corruption and decreases the quality of government and that in more democratic 
countries politicians behave more responsibly and accountably, which decreases the 
level of corruption, and increases the quality of government. 
The main limitation of our work relates to data availability, which may 
call into question the probative value of our results. Even though there are several 
indicators of fiscal decentralization, we used only one because the data for the 
selected sample is only available for this one indicator. In conclusion, the impact 
of decentralization on government quality depends on a number of factors that are 
sometimes difficult to capture in a single statistical model, which opens a wide 
field for further research on this topic. The development of new benchmarks that 
better reflect the multidimensionality of decentralization and government quality 
is another aspect that needs to be developed in the future. 
 
REFERENCES 
Bajo, A. and Bronić, M. (2004): Fiskalna decentralizacija u Hrvatskoj - problem 
fiskalnog izravnanja, Financijska teorija i praksa, 28(4). 
Bird, R. M., Wallich, C. (1993): Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental 
relations in transition economies: Towards a systematic framework of analysis (Vol. 
1122). World Bank Publications. 
EKON. MISAO I PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXX. (2021.) BR. 1. (285 - 302)                                  J. Visković et al: IMPACT OF POLITICAL... 
300 
Charron, N., et al. (2015): Mapping the regional divide in Europe: A measure for 
assessing quality of government in 206 European regions. Social Indicators Research, 
122(2). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-014-0702-y 
De Mello, L. R., Barenstein, M. (2001): Fiscal decentralization and governance: 
A cross-country analysis, Working Paper No. 01/71, International Monetary Fund 
available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract [18.05.2017.]. https://doi. 
org/10.5089/9781451849240.001 
Dreher, A. (2006): Power to the people? The impact of decentralization on 
governance, KOF Working paper No. 121., available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=879574 [18.05.2017.]. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.881542 
Dreher, A (2006): Power to the people? The impact of decentralization on governance, 
KOF Working Papers, No. 121, ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Zurich 
Ebel, R., Yilmaz, S. (2002): Način mjerenja fiskalne decentralizacije i njezin 
utjecaj na makroekonomske pokazatelje. u: Fiskalna decentralizacija u Hrvatskoj. Zagreb. 
World Bank Institute, pp 27 - 41. 
Enikolopov, R., Zhuravskaya, E. (2007): Decentralization and political 
institutions, Journal of public economics, 91(11-12), 2261-2290. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.jpubeco.2007.02.006 
Fan S., Lin C., Treisman D., (2009): Political decentralization and corruption: 
evidence from around the world, Journal of Public Economics, 93 (1-2), 14 – 34. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.001 
Fisman, R., Gatti, R. (2002): Decentralization and corruption: evidence across 
countries, Journal of Public Economics, 83(3), 325-345. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-
2727(00)00158-4 
Huther, J., Shah, A. (1998): Applying a simple measure of good governance to 
the debate on fiscal decentralization (Vol. 1894). World Bank Publications. 
Jurlina Alibegović, D., Hodžić, S and Bečić, E. (2018): Limited fiscal autonomy 
of Croatian large cities, Lex localis, 16(1), 107-128. https://doi.org/10.4335/ 
10.4335/16.1.107-128(2018) 
Kaufmann D, Kraay A, Mastrutzzi M, (2006): Governance matters V: aggregate 
and individual governance indicators for 1996 - 2005', RP 4012,World Bank,Washington, 
DC. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4012 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. (2017): The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), The 
Woirld Bank, available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/ wgi/#home [27.09.2018.] 
Korotun et al. (2020): The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Economic Growth in 
Central and Eastern Europe, European Journal of Sustainable Development, 9(3), 215-227. 
https://doi.org/10.14207/ejsd.2020.v9 n3p215 
Krtalić, S., Gasparini, A. (2007): Kako pristupiti fiskalnoj decentralizaciji?. 
Ekonomska istraživanja, 20(2), 104 - 115. 
Kyriacou, A., Roca-Sagales, O. (2009): Fiscal decentralization and the quality of 
government: Evidence from panel data. Hacienda Publica Espanola, 189(2), 131-156. 
Kyriacou, A. P., Roca-Sagales, O. (2011): Fiscal and political decentralization 
and government quality. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 29(2), 204 
- 223. https://doi.org/10.1068/c1016r 
EKON. MISAO I PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXX. (2021.) BR. 1. (285 - 302)                                  J. Visković et al: IMPACT OF POLITICAL... 
301 
Rodriguez‐Pose, A., Kroijer, A. (2009): Fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth in Central and Eastern Europe. Growth and Change, 40(3), 387-417. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2257.2009.00488.x 
Rodriguez-Pose, A., Ezcurra, R. (2010): Is fiscal decentralization harmful for 
economic growth? Evidence from the OECD countries, Journal of Economic Geography, 
11(4), 619-643. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbq025 
Rodriguez-Pose, A., Di Cataldo, M. (2014): Quality of government and 
innovative performance in the regions of Europe, Journal of Economic Geography, 15(4), 
673-706. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbu023 
Schneider, A. (2003): Decentralization: Conceptualization and measurement, Studies in 
Comparative International Development, 38(3), 32-56. https://doi.org/10. 1007/BF02686198 
Stojčić, N. and Šuman Tolić, M. (2019): Direct and Indirect Effects of Fiscal 
Decentralization on Economic Growth, Ekonomický časopis, 67(3), 280-306. 
Szarzec, K., Piatek, W., Baszyński, A. and Pilc, M. (2014): Institutions in transition 
countries. Publisher: Global Development Reseach Group, Poznan 2014 
Thiessen, U. (2003): Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in High 
Income OECD Countries', Fiscal Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 2003, 237-274. https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1475-5890.2003.tb00084.x 
Treisman D, (2000): The causes of corruption: a cross-national study, Journal of 
Public Economics, 76, 399 – 457. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00092-4 
Treisman D, (2006): Fiscal decentralization, governance, and economic 
performance: a Reconsideration, Economics and Politics, 18(2), 219-235. https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00169.x 
The World Bank (2001): Decentralization & Subnational Regional Economics, 
available at: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentra lization/what.htm [18.05.2017.] 
The World Bank (2017): World Development Report: Governance and the Law. 
World Bank Group (2018): World Data Bank, available at: https://data.world 
bank.org/indicator/ [27.09.2018.] 
The World Bank (2017): Database Of Political Institutions, available at: 











EKON. MISAO I PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXX. (2021.) BR. 1. (285 - 302)                                  J. Visković et al: IMPACT OF POLITICAL... 
302 
Dr. sc. Josip Visković 
Izvanredni profesor 





Dr. sc. Paško Burnać 
Docent 











UTJECAJ POLITIČKE I FISKALNE 
DECENTRALIZACIJE NA KVALITETU VLADE U 
ZEMLJAMA SREDNJE I ISTOČNE EUROPE 
 
Sažetak 
Još od sedamdesetih godina prošloga stoljeća, proces decentralizacije proširio se 
diljem svijeta. Danas više od 95 % demokratskih zemalja decentralizirano. 
Decentralizacija bi trebala osigurati dobro organiziranu i učinkovitu lokalnu 
vlast. Međutim, rezultati dosadašnjih istraživanja nisu u potpunosti jasni. 
Motivacija autora ovoga rada je ispitati utjecaj političke i fiskalne 
decentralizacije na kvalitetu vlade u sedamnaest zemalja u srednjoj i istočnoj 
Europi u razdoblju od 1998. do 2012. godine. Glavni cilj rada je ispitati ima li 
fiskalna decentralizacija pozitivan utjecaj na kvalitetu vlade i smanjuje li 
politička decentralizacija ovaj pozitivan utjecaj. Dodatni doprinos rada je 
uvođenje varijable decentralizacijske interakcije. Rezultati ovoga istraživanja 
pokazuju da fiskalna decentralizacija ima pozitivan utjecaj na upravljanje, dok za 
političku decentralizaciju nema statistički značajnih rezultata. Rezultati su 
također pokazali da bogatije zemlje imaju kvalitetnije vlade, a u zemljama u 
kojima je veća demokracija političari se ponašaju odgovornije, uslijed čega je 
stopa korupcije manja, a kvaliteta vlade veća. Može se zaključiti da politička 
decentralizacija poništava pozitivne učinke fiskalne decentralizacije na kvalitetu 
vlade, što se može objasniti slabije razvijenim institucijama na lokalnoj razini u 
zemljama srednje i istočne Europe. 
Ključne riječi: fiskalna decentralizacija, politička decentralizacija, kvaliteta 
vlade, zemlje srednje i istočne Europe. 
JEL klasifikacija: H11, H70, H71. 
